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Abstract: State accountability systems have been a primary school reform initiative in the 
US for the past 20 years, but often produce unintended negative consequences. In 2004, 
the Texas Education Agency (TEA) implemented the Performance Based Monitoring and 
Analysis System (PBMAS), which included an accountability indicator focused on the 
percentage of students found eligible for special education under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the nation’s special education law. From 2004 through 
2016, the percentage of students found eligible for special education in Texas declined 
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and Grant No. 1740695. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this 
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significantly, while the national rate held constant. Eventually, the U.S. Department of 
Education (ED) investigated TEA and the statewide implementation of IDEA. The 
purpose of this study is two-fold: (a) to evaluate the potential impact of the the PBMAS 
indicator on manipulation of special education identification practices; and (b) to describe 
how the indicator may have influenced school and district personnel. We highlight several 
concerning trends in state and district data and, through an analysis of publicly available 
reports from the ED, show how district and school personnel knowingly and unknowingly 
acted in ways that delayed and denied special education to potentially eligible students. We 
conclude with recommendations for TEA and implications for future research and policy.  
Keywords: special education; disproportionality; education policy; high-stakes 
accountability; response to intervention 
 
El límite de educación especial de Texas: Exploración del retraso y la denegación 
de apoyo a los estudiantes con discapacidades por parte del Estado 
Resumen: Los sistemas estatales de rendición de cuentas han sido una iniciativa de 
reforma de la escuela primaria en los Estados Unidos durante los últimos veinte años, pero 
a menudo producen consecuencias negativas no deseadas. En 2004, la Texas Education 
Agency (TEA) implementó el Performance Based Monitoring and Analysis System 
(PBMAS) que incluía un indicador de responsabilidad centrado en el porcentaje de 
estudiantes elegibles para educación especial bajo el Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA), ley de educación especial de la nación. Desde 2004 hasta 2016, el porcentaje 
de estudiantes elegibles para educación especial en Texas disminuyó significativamente, 
mientras que la tasa nacional se mantuvo constante. Finalmente, el Departamento de 
Educación de los Estados Unidos (ED) investigó la TEA y la implementación estatal de 
IDEA. El propósito de este estudio es doble: (a) evaluar el impacto potencial del indicador 
PBMAS en la manipulación de las prácticas de identificación de educación especial; y (b) 
describir cómo el indicador puede haber influido en el personal de la escuela y del distrito. 
Destacamos varias tendencias concernientes a los datos del estado y del distrito y, a través 
de un análisis de los informes de ED disponibles al público, mostramos cómo el distrito y 
el personal escolar actuaron a sabiendas e inconscientemente de una manera que retrasó y 
negó la educación especial a los estudiantes potencialmente elegibles. Concluimos con 
recomendaciones para TEA e implicaciones para futuras investigaciones y políticas.  
Palabras clave: educación especial; desproporcionalidad; política educativa; 
responsabilidad de “high-stakes”; intervención 
 
O limite de educação especial do Texas: Explorando o atraso e a negação de apoio 
a alunos com deficiências do Estado 
Resumo: Os sistemas de responsabilização do Estado têm sido uma iniciativa da reforma 
do ensino primário nos Estados Unidos nos últimos vinte anos, mas muitas vezes 
produzem consequências negativas não intencionais. Em 2004, a Texas Education Agency 
(TEA) implementou o Performance Based Monitoring and Analysis System (PBMAS), que 
incluiu um indicador de prestação de contas focado na porcentagem de estudantes 
elegíveis para educação especial sob a  Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 
a lei de educação especial do país. De 2004 a 2016, a porcentagem de estudantes 
qualificados para educação especial no Texas diminuiu significativamente, enquanto a taxa 
nacional permaneceu constante. Finalmente, o Departamento de Educação dos Estados 
Unidos (DE) investigou o TEA e a implementação estadual do IDEA. O propósito deste 
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estudo é duplo: (a) avaliar o impacto potencial do indicador PBMAS na manipulação de 
práticas de identificação de educação especial; e (b) descrever como o indicador pode ter 
influenciado o pessoal da escola e do distrito. Destacamos várias tendências relativas a 
dados estaduais e distritais e, por meio de uma análise de relatórios de DE disponíveis ao 
público, mostramos como os funcionários do distrito e da escola agiram consciente e 
inconscientemente de uma maneira que atrasou e negou a educação. especial para alunos 
potencialmente elegíveis. Concluímos com recomendações para ASD e implicações para 
futuras pesquisas e políticas. 
Palavras-chave: educação especial; desproporcionalidade; política educacional; 
responsabilidade de "high-stakes"; intervenção 
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Introduction 
Since the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001, and its subsequent 
reauthorization as the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) in 2015, state accountability systems 
monitored by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) have been a critical national school reform 
policy. Each state education agency (SEA) adopted standards, testing, and accountability policies as a 
mechanism for school improvement and to address long-standing equity problems. SEAs are 
provided with flexibility to maintain their priorities and incentives for the implementation of federal 
programs. The flexibility offered to SEAs has led to idiosyncratic accountability policies that have, at 
times, produced uneven results across similar contexts (Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2014). 
NCLB catalyzed SEAs to apply sanctions to districts and schools for low-performance, 
which in some cases created fear and uncertainty for district and school personnel. This uncertainty 
provoked both positive and negative responses (Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Harris & Herrington, 
2006; Nichols & Berliner, 2005). Some researchers claim accountability policies have been successful 
at increasing student achievement (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; Hursh, 2005), while others 
highlight negative unintended consequences (Amrein-Beardsley, 2009; Booher-Jennings, 2005; 
Figlio, 2006; Menken, 2006; Nichols & Berliner, 2007; Thompson & Allen, 2012). Most research on 
the subject has ignored the intersection of special education and accountability policy. 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, 2004), the US’s special education 
law, requires SEAs to monitor the implementation of special education. IDEA requires SEAs to 
monitor districts and school compliance and provide technical assistance to ensure schools deliver 
appropriate special education services (IDEA, 2004).2 In 2016, the Houston Chronicle released an 
investigative report criticizing TEA’s state accountability system known as the Performance Based 
Monitoring Analysis System (PBMAS), and one particular indicator (Indicator 10) focused on the 
appropriate identification of students with disabilities for special education. TEA adopted PBMAS 
in 2004, and between 2003-04 and 2016-17, Texas had a significant decline in students found eligible 
for special education under IDEA (from 11.6% in 2004 to 8.6% in 2016; Rosenthal, 2016a). The 
Houston Chronicle claimed that PBMAS Indicator 10 “led to the systemic denial of [special education] 
services by school districts to tens of thousands of families of every race and class across the state.” 
(Rosenthal, 2016a)  
The purpose of this study was (a) to evaluate the relationship between the PBMAS Indicator 
10 and special education identification practices and (b) to explore administrator and educator 
perceptions of PBMAS. To do so, we relied on enrollment data and publicly available documents. 
The first research aim was to descriptively examine documents and national and state special 
education data for evidence suggesting manipulation in special education identification in Texas 
between 2004 and 2016. After we verified manipulation likely occurred, we focused on our second 
aim: to describe how PBMAS Indicator 10 influenced district and school personnel. We utilized 
interview data published in Houston Chronicle reports and in an ED (2018) monitoring report to 
understand how district and school personnel were influenced. We verified claims using publicly 
available district documents, such as district corrective action plans and district demographic data 
reported to TEA annually and made publicly available through TEA and district websites.  
Empirically documenting the effects of TEA’s PBMAS Indicator 10 not only contributes to 
the literature on state accountability systems but can also raise attention to special education policy 
issues. In what follows, we review research focused on state accountability systems, special 
education, and the requirements of IDEA. Next, we describe the methods used to conduct this 
                                                 
2 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.149 
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study. Then, we present findings aligned to the stated aims of this article. Finally, we conclude with a 
discussion of findings and policy and research implications. 
 
State Accountability Systems and Special Education Law 
In this section, we review research and underlying theories of action of state-level 
accountability systems. Next, we provide an overview of federal special education policy and 
accountability. This overview includes a discussion of areas of IDEA relevant to this study, 
including the Child Find mandate, identification and disproportionality, and response to intervention 
(RTI). Each area of IDEA is germane to evaluating what occurred in Texas following the 
implementation of the PBMAS in 2004.  
Logic and Outcomes of State Accountability Systems 
State accountability systems focus on monitoring student achievement outcomes at district 
and school levels. Outcomes are disaggregated by race, economic status, first language, and disability 
status. SEAs are given flexibility developing their systems, which include selecting priorities, goals, 
and sanctions and incentives to promote compliance and performance. Under NCLB, states were 
required to administer sanctions to districts or schools that did not meet expectations, including: 
forced reduction in administrative funding, implementation of new curriculum, removal and 
replacement of personnel, altering governance arrangements, and appointing trustees in place of a 
school board or superintendent (ED, 2002). State accountability systems are grounded in several 
assumptions (Hursh, 2005; Jacob, 2017; Lipman, 2004). First, public education’s primary goal is 
student achievement, which can be accurately measured by standardized assessments. Second, the 
application of incentives and disincentives motivate schools to improve and align efforts to focus on 
public education’s primary goal. Third, parents and communities can make decisions about where 
they send their children to school based on publicly available achievement data, which incentivizes 
school improvement. Fourth, proper federal and state oversight minimizes or eliminates unintended 
consequences.  
Many critics question the logic of accountability systems and whether performance on 
standardized tests accurately gauges learning and school improvement (e.g., Amrein-Beardsley, 2009; 
Booher-Jennings, 2005; Figlio, 2006). Some view accountability systems as divisive, anti-democratic, 
and a contributing factor to cheating, gaming, and other detrimental educational practices. Jacob and 
Levitt (2003) argued that “high-powered incentive systems, especially those with bright line rules, 
may induce unexpected behavioral distortions such as cheating” (p. 843). Drawing on data from 
Chicago Public Schools, Jacob and Levitt (2003) found teacher and administrator cheating occurred 
in a minimum of 4-5% of elementary school classrooms annually. Jacob and Levitt’s findings are 
aligned with what Nichols and Berliner (2007) referred to as Campbell’s law, which stipulated that 
“the more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will 
be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it 
was intended to monitor” (Campbell, 1979, p. 68). 
Numerous studies document how accountability policies, at times, triggered: (a) teaching to 
the test, narrowing curriculum, and the de-professionalizing the teaching profession (Dee & Jacob, 
2011; Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2014; Valli & Buese, 2007; Watanabe, 2007); (b) a medical 
model approach to identifying students deemed just below performance cut-offs (commonly 
referred to as “bubble kids”) and “treating” them via targeted “interventions” at the expense of both 
lower and higher performing students (Amrein-Beardsley, 2009; Booher-Jennings, 2005; Nichols & 
Berliner, 2005); (c) a loss of trust with families coupled with a growing sense of disengagement in 
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educational governance processes (Rhodes, 2015); (d) harsh and exclusionary disciplinary policies 
that prioritize compliance and docility to minimize classroom disruption or the strategic discipline of 
low-performing students during testing windows (Figlio, 2006; Thompson & Allen, 2012); (e) 
reshaping student testing pools by removing, improperly promoting or demoting students, or 
pushing students out of school (Cullen & Reback, 2006; Vasquez Heilig & Darling-Hammond, 
2008); (f) teacher turnover (Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, & Diaz, 2004; Feng, Figlio, & Sass, 2018); and 
(g) cheating or tampering with testing materials (Amrein-Beardsley, Berliner, & Rideau, 2010.  
The media and law enforcement agencies have examined numerous instances of cheating. 
For example, a former superintendent of the El Paso Independent School District (EPISD) was 
convicted with several district and school-based administrators for participating in a cheating 
scheme where students of Mexican descent (many of whom were English Language Learners 
(ELLs) were improperly promoted, demoted, or pushed out of school to avoid taking standardized 
tests (DeMatthews, Izquierdo, & Knight, 2017; El Paso Times, 2017). In Atlanta, teachers and 
administrators were convicted and sent to prison for participating in a cheating scandal that inflated 
test scores (Blinder, 2015). In the School District of Philadelphia, testing improprieties were found 
in at least 19 schools, including cases where administrators were giving answer keys to teachers, 
teachers were gathering secretly to change answers, and principals were taking exams and doctoring 
answer sheets (Rich & Hurdle, 2014). In New York City, several investigations revealed principals 
and teachers engaged in test tampering, grade inflation, and grade changing to improve achievement 
levels and graduation rates (Harris, 2015). At the time this article was written, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the ED were investigating the District of Columbia Public Schools about 
inflated graduation rates and the bullying of teacher/counselor whistleblowers (Jamison & Nirappil, 
2018).  
State Accountability and Special Education 
Compliance measures. Much attention has rightfully been given to state accountability 
policies under NCLB/ESSA and the unintended consequences associated with high-stakes testing, 
but this focus largely ignored special education (Elbaum, 2014; Elliot, Erickson, Thurlow, & Shriner, 
2000; Yell, Shriner, & Katsiyannis, 2006). The Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(EAHCA) of 1975 laid the foundation for IDEA and accountability by guaranteeing the rights of 
individuals with disabilities to public education and providing federal funding. EAHCA mandated 
“zero reject,” which established that all children with disabilities were entitled to a free and 
appropriate public education (FAPE) and that testing and evaluation for special education eligibility 
needed to be administered in a non-discriminatory manner. In 1990, EAHCA was amended as 
IDEA and subsequently amended again in 1997. President George W. Bush appointed a 
commission to issue a report on special education before the 2004 reauthorization of IDEA (ED, 
2002). The Thomas Fordham Institute also released a series of reports in 2001 that identified 
challenges in special education eligibility (Finn, Rotherham, & Hokanson, 2001). The reports 
described special education as compliance-driven which led states to focus on process rather than 
outcomes. Both organizations recommended a results-oriented approach to special education.  
The reauthorization of IDEA in 2004 was results-oriented and aligned with NCLB's 
principles of accountability (Turnbull, 2005). Within the ED is the Office of Special Education 
Programs (OSEP), which is tasked with providing leadership, financial support, and assistance to 
states and districts for improving results for students with disabilities.3 IDEA required states to 
develop a State Performance Plan (SPP) and Annual Performance Report (APR) to evaluate the 
                                                 
3 Throughout the article, we primarily refer to the Department of Education (ED) and its Office of Special 
Education and Rehabilitation Services (OSERs) and Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP).  
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IDEA implementation and improvement efforts. SEAs report on 20 indicators and the ED uses 
SPP/APR and public meetings to annually determine if the state is meeting IDEA requirements, 
needs assistance, needs intervention, or needs substantial intervention. Indicators 5, 9, and 10 are 
most pertinent for identification. Indicator 5 mandates that SEAs report the percent of children 
served through IDEA between the ages of 6 through 21 and the degree to which they have been 
included in the regular classroom. Indicator 9 requires SEAs to identify districts with 
“disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic groups in special education and related 
services, to the extent the representation is the result of inappropriate identification” (IDEA, 2004).4 
Indicator 10 requires SEAs to identify the percent of districts in the state with “disproportionate 
representation of racial and ethnic groups in specific disability categories that is the result of inappropriate 
identification” (IDEA, 2004, emphasis added).5 
Several problems concerning the efficacy of the indicators may result in the ED’s inability to 
monitor special education implementation. A analysis of SPP/APR data found that even though 
high levels of disproportionality remained constant across the nation for decades (discussed in next 
section), most SEAs identify few or no districts with disproportionality that used inappropriate 
identification practices (Albrecht, Skiba, Losen, Chung, & Middelberg, 2012). In 2005 and 2006, 
TEA reported only 2% and 0.16% of districts, respectively, with disproportionate representation of 
racial and ethnic groups in special education and related services that were the result of 
inappropriate identification (Indicator 9 and 10) (see OSEP, 2018).6 
Child Find. IDEA requires SEAs to proactively identify students with disabilities, remedy 
racial disproportionality, and utilize response to intervention (RTI) as necessary to support eligibility 
decisions.7 Within IDEA (2004) is a Child Find mandate rooted in the principles of guaranteed 
participation of Setion 504, which requires all SEAs to have in effect policies and procedures to 
ensure districts proactively identify, locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities. The provision 
includes all children suspected of having a disability. If school staff or district administrators have 
reason to believe that a child has a disability, these individuals have an affirmative duty to refer the 
child for special education. Students receiving passing grades or advancing from grade to grade may 
still have a disability and may still be eligible for special education and related services.  
The Child Find mandate also requires SEAs to ensure: “A practical method is developed and 
implemented to determine which children are currently receiving special education and related 
services” (IDEA, 2004). Implementing Child Find can be difficult and districts sometimes fail to 
identify students who are eligible for special education for many reasons. Judicial decisions have 
shaped Child Find policies. Regardless of challenges, schools must evaluate students suspected of 
having a disability within a “reasonable time” (see W.B. v. Matula, 1995). Parents are not solely 
responsible for triggering the referral process or ensuring their child is identified. SEAs, districts, and 
schools are all responsible for identifying and evaluating children (see Schaffer v. Weast, 2005). 
                                                 
4 See 20 U.S.C. §1416(a)(3)(C) 
5 See 20 U.S.C. §1416(a)(3)(C) 
6The ED (2007) clarified this point in a memo to SEA special education directors: “each State has the 
discretion to define what constitutes significant disproportionality for the LEAs in the State and for the State 
in general” (p. 3). In Texas, districts are considered to have disproportionate representation when it exceeds a 
risk difference threshold of 11.95 percentage points (TEA, 2017).  
7 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 made it “illegal to deny participation in activities, benefits of 
programs, or to in any way discriminate against a person with a disability solely because of their disability.”  
Any program receiving federal assistant could not deny equal access to people with disabilities. 
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 Identification and racial disproportionality. SEA monitoring requirements in the IDEA 
1997 and 2004 reauthorizations acknowledged racial/ethnic disproportionality was a problem. 
IDEA (2004) required that the: “state has in effect policies and procedures … designed to prevent 
the inappropriate over-identification or disproportionate representation by race and ethnicity of 
children as children with disabilities.” This statutory requirement, in part, led to the creation of the 
SPP/APR. The ED conducts audits of disproportioantelity across states. OSEP provides an annual 
report to Congress documenting the implementation of IDEA. Over-identification is persistently a 
problem. For example, in 2015 Black students ages 6 through 21 were 1.4 times more likely to be 
served under IDEA than children in all other racial/ethnic groups (ED, 2017). Black and Hispanic 
students were also more likely to be served under IDEA for several disability categories, compared 
to children in all other racial/ethnic groups (ED, 2017). The fact that Black and Hispanic students 
are more likely to be identified into these disability categories raised attention to racial bias in the 
identification and referral process (Blanchett, 2006). Specific learning disabilities (SLD) is the largest 
disability category under IDEA and represents 38.8% of all students identified with a disability and 
one in which Black and Hispanic students are perpetually over-represented (ED, 2017).  
In response to over-identification, IDEA (2004) provided additional criteria for determining 
the SLD classification. A team may determine a child eligible for special education under the SLD 
disability category when the child does not achieve adequately for her or his age in one or more 
areas (oral expression, listening comprehension, written expression, basic reading skill, reading 
fluency skills, reading comprehension, mathematics calculation, mathematics problem solving). A 
team may also determine the child eligible if the child does not make sufficient progress on state-
approved-grade-level standards when using a “process based on the child’s response to scientific, 
research-based intervention” (IDEA, 2004). Other factors must also be considered, but RTI is an 
essential process for accurately identifying students with disabilities as well as providing support to 
any struggling learner regardless of whether they qualify for special education.  
RTI was posed as an alternative method for providing early intervention to struggling 
students. The ED does not support one RTI framework, but rather a core set of characteristics.8 
The lack of clarity may have led schools to inappropriately use RTI to delay or deny special 
education identification. In a 2011 Dear College letter from ED (Musgrove, 2011), all SEA directors 
of special education were informed of the following: “States and LEAs have an obligation to ensure 
the evaluation of children suspected of having a disability are not delayed or denied because of 
implementation of an RTI strategy” (p. 1). The letter specifically stated that parents could request an 
initial evaluation at any time. The letter reminded SEAs that districts can deny a parent’s request for 
an initial evaluation, but must do so in writing with the basis for the decision. 
Methods 
The purpose of this study is twofold: (a) to descriptively evaluate national and state special 
education data and documents for evidence of manipulation in the identification process in Texas 
between 2004 and 2016; and (b) to describe educator perceptions of the PBMAS indicator, in 
particular, how PBMAS may have led school and district personnel to engage in practices that 
                                                 
8 The DOE defines RTI as a: “Schoolwide approach that addresses the needs of all students, including 
struggling learners and students with disabilities, and integrates assessment and intervention within a multi-
level instructional and behavioral system to maximize student achievement and reduce problem 
behaviors…schools identify students at-risk of poor learning outcomes, monitor student progress, provide 
evidence-based interventions, and adjust the intensity and nature of those interventions depending on a 
student’s responsiveness” (Musgrove, 2011, pp. 1-2). 
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denied or delayed eligible students with disabilities. Evaluating the statewide denial of eligible 
students with disabilities is controversial, especially after publicly released reports by the Houston 
Chronicle and ED. TEA’s actions, and the actions of district and school personnel may very well lead 
to legal action. In this context, interviewing personnel would be potentially harmful to participants if 
identifying information were released. Rather than engaging in research that could assume risk, we 
utilized a mixed-method approach that consisted of a quantitative analysis of special education data 
and a qualitative analysis of publicly available documents. A mixed-method approach allowed us to 
triangulate data and provide a “confluence of evidence that breeds credibility” (Eisner, 1991, p. 110). 
Our mixed-methods approach has the added benefit of corroborating findings across quantitative 
and qualitative data. We begin by describing the quantitative methods that we apply to secondary 
datasets and then describe the qualitative data collection and analysis process that corroborated our 
quantitative findings.  
Quantitative Analysis of Special Education Data 
Data collection. To address our first research aim, we apply quantitative analysis to publicly 
available federal special education enrollment data. We constructed a district-level datatset that 
combines National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) data on student demographics, including 
special education enrollment rates for each district, with data from the U.S. Census Bureau that 
includes information about child poverty rates. The data include all school years from 1994-95 to 
2014-15.  
Data analysis. Our quantitative analyses include three analytic strategies that together 
evaluate the relationship between implementation of the PBMAS indicator and the likelihood a 
Texas student is identified as having a disability. First, we examine statewide trends in special 
education enrollment before and after implementation of PBMAS, and compare those trends to all 
other states. Although the percent of students in special education may change over time for a 
variety of reasons, a signifcant change in Texas that coincides with implementation of PBMAS (in 
the years following 2004-05) is suggestive of policy-induced manipulation of special education 
identification practices. Distinct changes in the percent of students in special education in Texas 
following 2004-05 may be related to overall national trends. We therefore use all other states as a 
comparison group for Texas, and examine whether there are changes in special education 
enrollments at the national level in the years following 2004-05.  
Prior literature suggests that districts face varying degrees of accountability pressure. Our 
main hypothesis – that the accountability pressure associated with PBMAS caused district 
administrators to systematically reduce the percent of students in special education for reasons not 
related to actual disability rates – can thus be further tested by examining whether districts facing 
greater accountability pressure were more likely to reduce their special education enrollment levels 
following implementation of PBMAS. As noted earlier, districts with high rates of special education 
enrollment likely faced a greater degree of accountability pressure, compared to districts with lower 
special education enrollments prior to implementation of PBMAS. Our second quantitative analytic 
strategy is to test whether accountability pressure may explain differences in district responses to 
PBMAS. We run OLS regressions predicting special education enrollment, based on particular 
district characteristics including the pre-PBMAS special education enrollment rate. We include year 
fixed effects, d, and interact year fixed effects with dummy variables for whether the district fell in 
the highest or lowest quintiles of special education enrollment, prior to the implementation of 
PBMAS. We suspect that districts with highest rates of special education enrollment likely faced 
greater pressure to reduce special education enrollment rates. We conduct similar analyses for high- 
and low-poverty districts, urban, suburban, and rural districts (based on NCES classifications), and 
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for larger and smaller districts. We run the following model for all Texas districts for school years 
1994-95 to 2014-15, indexing for year (t) and district (d):  
 
%SPEDdt = 0 + 1 High-SPEDl + d + d * High-SPEDl + Xdt' + dt 
 
The vector Xdt includes district poverty rate, enrollment size, and whether the district is 
urban, suburban or rural (we also include dummy variables for low-SPED so that the reference 
group is districts in the middle three quitniles of pre-PBMAS special education enrollment rate). We 
hypothesize that the decline in special education enrollment rates will be greater for districts that 
face greater accountability pressure because of their high rates of special education enrollment prior 
to PBMAS. In alternate models, we exchange the high-SPED and low-SPED variables with 
indicators for high- and low-poverty, district size, and whether the district is urban, suburban, or 
rural. These alternate models examine whether changes in special education rates following 
implementation of PBMAS were related to poverty rate, district size, or urbanicity.  
Our third quanitative analytic approach examines the overall distribution of the percent of 
students in special education, across districts in the most recent year of data. The rate of child 
disability is not uniformly distributed across districts (Baker & Ramsey, 2011). Rather, variation in 
the percent of students in special education across districts typically results in a roughly normal 
distribution centered around the mean. Under the hypothesis of no manipulation in special 
education identification practices, we expect to find a normal distribution with no significant 
“jumps” in a graph of the distribution of special education enrollment rates across districts. Jumps in 
the distribution near the PBMAS target of 8.5% of students suggests that there may be manipulation 
in the special education identification practices. In particular, if a significantly greater number of 
districts report special education enrollment rates just below 8.5%, while significantly fewer districts 
report rates just above 8.5%, then districts are likely strategically lowering the proportion of students 
receiving special education services. We use the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008) to determine whether 
any inconsistency in the distribution of the percent of students in special education across districts is 
statistically significant. This same statistical test is used in regression discontinuity studies to test 
whether there is manipulation in a “running variable.” However, we do not specify a traditional 
regression discontinuity design because our goal is simply to identify manipulation in special 
education identification, not to estimate the causal impact of a program or policy.  
Qualitative Document Analysis of Publicy Available Documents 
Data collection. We relied on publicly available documents and applied a qualitative 
document analysis approach (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2018). Documents provided data on background 
and context, a means for tracking change and development over time, and served as a tool for 
verifying findings (Bowen, 2009). As noted by Yin (2018), documents are often readily available 
online (especially state and federal government documents), they are often exact in that they 
document names, references, and details, and they can cover a long span of time across various 
settings. The strengths of document analysis fit well with our research aims of exploring 
manipulation of the identification process and examining the role of the PBMAS indicator, although 
we recognize that document analysis has several inherent limitations. Documents are often produced 
for a purpose other than research, they can lack specific detail concerning the researcher's questions, 
some documents are not publicly available, and organizations may purposefully release or fail to 
publish documents based on priorities, agendas, and policies (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2018). Given these 
limitations, we outline our document collection and analysis process and provide in Appendix 1 a list 
of all primary documents. 
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Between September 2017 and February 2018, we collected documents by using keyword 
searches on Google, the Houston Chronicle, TEA, and ED websites. The terms “special education,” 
“student identification,” “PBMAS,” “state level accountability,” and several other key words were 
used to search these websites. Most documents collected spanned between a publication date of 
2004, when the PBMAS system was first initiated, and January 2018, when the ED released its final 
report and TEA responded with a draft corrective action plan. Primarily, we identified three types of 
documents: (a) media-related documents, such as the Houston Chronicle’s investigative report and 
other related coverage in various Texas and national media outlets; (b) government documents 
produced by TEA and ED; and (c) internal district documents made available via a Houston Chronicle 
website and through directly accessing school district websites. The Houston Chronicle completed an 
extensive report that included state and district documents that we read and reviewed. In total, the 
Houston Chronicle conducted over 300 interviews with experts, current and former Texas educators 
and administrators, and parents. In response to the Houston Chronicle’s allegations, the ED conducted 
an investigation and provided a report based on their investigation. The ED’s investigation included 
two primary data collection periods. First, ED held public hearings in December 2016 in multiple 
cities. Parents and families shared their experiences and the ED posted a blog for parents to publicly 
comment, which received over 400 posts in two months. In March 2017, ED visited 12 Texas 
districts, interviewed district/school leaders and teachers, and reviewed district documents. 
Afterward, the ED interviewed TEA staff.  
Data analysis. We began the document analysis process by creating a database (See 
Appendix Table A1). We read and re-read each document and classified documents based on 
chronology, who created the document, the document’s purposes, its intended audience or recipient, 
how the document was used, and on what occasion might the document be used (Savin-Baden & 
Major, 2013). In assessing the quality of these documents, we asked the following questions, is the 
document: authentic and credible, is it representative, and what does it mean (Scott, 1990). 
Concerning credibility, we considered the creator and viewpoint of each document. Documents 
collected and presented publicly by the Houston Chronicle may have some inherent bias given they are 
written for the general public and may be sensationalized to sell newspapers.  
Next, we read each document and conducted a content analysis to identify information (such 
as interviews with teachers and principals or district generated documents). For example, all 
educator and administrator quotes were isolated, coded, and organized by date and topic. We 
arranged documents chronologically to help us tell the story of how the PBMAS indicator and other 
TEA policies impacted districts and schools. We also read and identified different perceptions, 
unspoken policies and practices, assumptions, and instances where district and school-based 
administrators and teachers admitted to purposefully or unintentionally denying or delaying eligible 
students with disabilities. We coded these topics, read through the selection of codes, and used these 
codes to generate our findings. When possible, we verified and triangulated the claims made by 
interviewees using publicly available data.9 Lastly, we had two current district administrators review 
our findings and provide feedback. 
Findings 
We report findings in two sections, in line with our two research aims. We first describe our 
results concerning the development of PBMAS and the potential manipulation of special education 
                                                 
9 For example, later in this article we provide a quote by Fort Bend ISD special education director and use 
publicly available data on the district’s special education enrollment to verify the director’s claims. 
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identification practices related to PBMAS. Then, we present findings related to educator perceptions 
of PBMAS, which demonstrate how PBMAS Indicator 10 may have influenced district and school 
personnel behavior.  
Manipulation of Special Education Identification 
PBMAS. In 2004, special education enrollment was 11.6% of the student population in 
Texas. That year, TEA began implementing the Performance-Based Monitoring Analysis 
System. According to TEA (2018), PBMAS is an “automated data system that reports annually 
on the performance of school districts and charter schools in selected program areas.” PBMAS 
includes progress indicators focusing on specific student populations that help inform the 
development of TEA-required district improvement plans when district’s do not meet TEA 
expectations. TEA administrators monitor PBMAS ensure a baseline of student performance 
and program compliance. According to TEA policy, when the state identifies noncompliance, 
student performance, or program effectiveness concerns, “districts are required to participate in 
these activities [ e.g., continuous improvement, improvement planning, progress reporting] and 
may also be subject to additional sanctions and interventions, including on-site reviews” (TEA, 
2018).  
PBMAS Indicator 10 awarded districts a perfect performance level if fewer than 8.5% of 
students received special education (other performance cut-offs were at 11% and 15%). The 
impact of PBMAS Indicator 10 was somewhat immediate as we will show, but significant 
decreases in special education enrollment occurred over time. Table 1 provides a timeline of 
PBMAS and subsequent investigations. More than 12 years after PBMAS was adopted, on 
September 10, 2016, the Houston Chronicle published the initial investigative article entitled, 
Denied: How Texas Keeps Tens of Thousands of Children Out of Special Education 
(Rosenthal, 2016). Houston Chronicle journalist Brian Rosenthal continued to publish a 7-part 
investigative report through 2016.  
 
Table 1 
Timeline of events leading to the ED investigation 
Date Author Document/Action Description 
9/10/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: How Texas Keeps 
Tens of Thousands of 
Children Out of Special 
Education 
Part 1 of the Houston Chronicle’s report 
on the Texas special education cap 
10/3/2016 Acting Assistant 
Secretary Sue 
Swenson, 
Department of 
Education 
Untitled Memo: “Inquiry 
into Houston Chronicle 
Allegations” 
ED requires written response to 
allegations from TEA within 30 days. 
10/22/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Schools Push 
Students Out of Special 
Education to Meet State 
Limit 
Part 2 of the Houston Chronicle’s report 
on the Texas special education cap 
11/2/16 Deputy 
Commissioner of 
Academics Penny 
Schwinn, Texas 
Education Agency 
TEA Response to 10/3/16 
ED Letter 
TEA responses to allegations with 
supplemental documents: 
 Response to Allegations 
 2014 Summary of Public 
Comment on PBMAS 
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Table 1 cont. 
Timeline of events leading to the ED investigation 
    2016 Summary of Public 
Comment on PBMAS 
 Child Count Rates from 2000-01 
through 2015-16 
 Longitudinal Special Education 
Representation Rates in Texas 
Not the Whole Picture: Letter from 
HISD Assistant Superintendent 
Sowmya Kumar 
11/9/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Mentally Ill Lose 
Out as Special Education 
Declines 
Part 3 of the Houston Chronicle’s report 
on the Texas special education cap 
11/17/2016 Deputy 
Commissioner of 
Academics Penny 
Schwinn, Texas 
Education Agency 
Reminder about Important 
District Responsibilities 
under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act 
Letter to all Texas administrators 
about their Child Find obligations 
and related policies. 
12/10/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Texas Schools Shut 
Non-English Speakers Out 
of Special Ed 
Part 4 of the Houston Chronicle’s report 
on the Texas special education cap 
12/24/2016 Susan Carroll and 
Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Unable to Get 
Special Education in Texas, 
One Family Moved 
Part 5 of the Houston Chronicle’s report 
on the Texas special education cap 
12/27/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Houston Schools 
Systematically Block 
Disabled Kids from Special 
Ed 
Part 6 of the Houston Chronicle’s report 
on the Texas special education cap 
12/29/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Special Ed Cap 
Drives Families Out of 
Public Schools 
Part 7 of the Houston Chronicle’s report 
on the Texas special education cap 
6/28/2017 Acting Director of 
Office of Special 
Education Programs 
Ruth E. Ryder, 
Department of 
Education 
Chief State School Officer 
[2017 Needs Assistance 
Determination] 
Annual determination letter that 
provides DOE’s reasons for 
determining Texas “Needs 
Assistance” in implementing Part B 
of IDEA. 
1/2018 Department of 
Education, Office of 
Special Education 
and Rehabilitative 
Services 
39th Annual Report to 
Congress on the 
Implementation of the 
Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 2017 
Annual national report describing 
progress on the implementation of 
IDEA with a focus on national and 
state-level implementation. 
1/11/2018 Department of 
Education 
2017 Full Monitoring Visit 
Letter 
Findings Letter from Department of 
Education Investigation 
 
On September 11, 2016, the ED was provided copies of the Houston Chronicle’s report. 
On October 3, 2016, the ED contacted TEA commissioner Mike Morath expressing concern 
and requiring a written response. TEA responded on November 2, 2016, claiming that the 
report had numerous inaccuracies, but committed to no longer using PBMAS Indicator 10. In 
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December and January, 2016-17, the ED toured Texas, spoke with concerned families in Dallas, 
Houston, El Paso, Edinburg, and Austin, and conducted interviews with TEA officials to gain 
information about state policies, procedures, and practices. On January 11, 2018, the ED 
provided TEA a written summary of TEA’s noncompliance: 
1. TEA failed to ensure that all children with disabilities residing in the State who are in 
need of special education and related services were identified, located, and evaluated, 
regardless of the severity of their disability, as required by IDEA section 612(a)(3) and its 
implementing regulation at 34 CFR §300.111. 
2. TEA failed to ensure that FAPE was made available to all children with disabilities 
residing in the State in Texas’s mandated age ranges (ages 3 through 21), as required by 
IDEA section 612(a)(1) and its implementing regulation at 34 CFR§300.101.  
3. TEA failed to fulfill its general supervisory and monitoring responsibilities as required by  
IDEA sections 612(a)(11) and 616(a)(1)(C), and their implementing regulations at 34 
CFR §§ 300.149 and 300.600, along with 20 U.S.C. 1232d(b)(3)(A), to ensure that ISDs 
throughout the State properly implemented the IDEA child find and FAPE 
requirements. (ED, 2018, p. 4). 
 
Early warning signs. In 2010, TEA’s special education director was asked about a decline 
in special education enrollment during a state Texas Senate Education Committee. The director did 
not mention PBMAS Indicator 10. He responded: “We fundamentally believe it has a lot to do with 
improving general education” (Rosenthal, 2016.1). An analysis of SPP/APR reports from Texas and 
special education data suggested problems in the identification process in Texas between 2004, when 
PBMAS was first initiated, and 2016. TEA reported 2% and 0.16% of districts with disproportionate 
representation of racial and ethnic groups in special education that is the result of inappropriate 
(Indicator 9) identified in 2005 and 2006, and not one district between 2007 and 2014. These 
findings appear to be in stark contrast to findings presented in ED’s annual report to Congress, 
which documents over-identification and disproportionality (ED, 2017). While disproportionality is 
not the same issue as under-identification per se, the contrast between a limited number of districts 
identified with disproportionate representation in a large state with more than 1,200 districts should 
have raised red flags to other issues like declining identification statewide. Moreover, between 2007 
and 2015, Texas received a “needs assistance” or “needs intervention” status from the ED.  
TEA responses. The ED required TEA to respond to the Houston Chronicle’s allegations. 
TEA denied any wrongdoing and released a response: 
TEA strongly disagrees with statements in the article and with the overall premise 
of the article that Texas educators have been engaged in concerted, widespread 
efforts to deny eligible students with disabilities with needed special education 
services based on the special education representation indicator in the PBMAS. 
(TEA, 2016b, p. 1) 
 
TEA claimed they did not have “specific evidence indicating there has been a systemic denial of 
special education services to eligible students” and that the “sole purpose of the special education 
representation indicator is to promote proper eligibility determinations so that only children with 
disabilities who require special education are placed in special education programs” (p.2).  
In an attachment to the response, TEA included a document entitled “Response to Article 
Allegations” (TEA, n.d.-c). The document consisted of a two-column table (direct quotes of 
allegations from the Houston Chronicle’s report in column one and TEA response in column two). In 
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some cases, TEA provided evidence to refute the Houston Chronicle’s claims. The document also 
described the process in which the Indicator was developed: 
In 2004, after nine stakeholder meetings were held with diverse groups of 
individuals representing school districts, education service centers, professional 
organizations, advocacy groups, and others, these recommendations were 
proposed, and subsequently adopted, under the Texas Administrative Code 
(TAC)… The special education representation indicator in PBMAS does not 
indicate what percentage of students should get special education services. It is an 
indicator designed to report four different ranges that capture the various rates of 
special education representation among districts. (TEA, n.d.-c, p. 1) 
 
TEA claimed all four cut point ranges were established based on a relative standard, which “are not 
tied to an absolute requirement or goal.. and there is not a state expectation that districts will achieve 
the relative standard over time” (TEA, n.d.-c, p. 1).  
PBMAS Indicator 10 was publicly announced and described the public process in which 
PBMAS was adopted. This process included an announcement to nearly 16,000 listserve subscribers 
and the public posting of each year’s PBMAS manual. TEA released 2014 and 2016 documents, 
both entitled, “PBMAS Rule-Making: Excerpt from Public Comments.” Each document included 
generic comments and criticism for PBMAS Indicator 10 from several organizations. In 2014, 
Disability Rights Texas, the Texas Council of Developmental Disabilities, and the ARC of Texas 
expressed concern for the decrease of students being identified into special education. In 2016, 
Disability Rights Texas once again “expressed grave concern that SPED Indicator #10 sets a target 
for districts to enroll students with disabilities at only a certain rate” and that the group received 
“numerous complaints over the years about referrals not being made because of concern about the 
indicator” (TEA, n.d.-b, p. 1). The Texas Charter Schools Association argued that Indicator 10 was 
“at odds with the federal Child Find mandate” (p. 2). The ARC of Texas “suggested the indicator 
had a significant impact on the number of students enrolled in special education services and that 
enrollment mirrored the national average at 11.5% in 2006, but quickly dropped to 8.5% after the 
PL was implemented…” (p. 3).  
TEA (2016a) also released a memo to all districts entitled, “Reminder about important 
district responsibilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.” The letter noted that 
a district's failure to identify students eligible for special education “is a serious matter” and could 
result in the denial of a free and appropriate public education (FAPE). TEA (2016a) reminded 
districts that special education services to eligible students with disabilities "cannot be limited in any 
way by district's anticipated, or actual, PL assignments on Indicator 10" (p. 3). The letter also noted 
that reports had been made that districts may be delaying or denying special education referrals to 
complete RTI.  
Evaluation of special education data. Much of the findings described above are 
confirmed in our analysis of special education data. Figure 1 shows changes in special education 
enrollment from 2000-01 to 2014-15, for Texas and for all other states. The vertical dashed line on 
school year 2005-06 indicates the first year in which PBMAS was active. In the years leading up to 
implementation of PBMAS, Texas had lower rates of special education enrollment compared to all 
other states, but the trend lines between Texas and other states were parallel. From 2000-01 to 2004-
05, Texas special education enrollment changed from 11.9% to 11.8%. In all other states, special 
education enrollment changed from 13.1% to 13.9% over the same period. However, in the years 
following implementation of PBMAS, Texas school dsitricts saw substantial delines in special 
education enrollment, from 11.8% in 2004-05 to 9.0% in 2014-15. Meanwhile, the rate of special 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 27 No. 2 16 
 
 
education enrollment in all other states was relatively stable (going from 13.9% in 2004-05 to 13.2% 
in 2014-15).  
 
 
Figure 1. Special education enrollment rate in Texas and all other states, 2000-01 to 2014-15 
 
Note. The vertical dashed line highlights the first school year in which PBMAS indicator 10 was in effect. 
 
Figure 2 displays changes in special education enrollment over time for districts that may 
have faced particularly high special education accountability pressure – those with high rates of 
special education enrollment prior to PBMAS. We compare “high-SPED” districts (those in the top 
quintile of special education enrollment during the 2003-04 school year) to otherwise similar mid-
SPED and low-SPED districts. That is, high-SPED districts are compared to mid- and low-SPED 
districts with similar overall enrollment size, poverty rates, and in the same urbanicity classification. 
Figure 2 shows that districts that likely faced the greatest pressure from the PBMAS Indicator 10 
reduced their special education enrollments by the largest amounts. From 2003-04 to 2014-15, low-
SPED districts reduced special education enrollment from 9.2% to 7.8%, a decrease of 1.4 
percentage points or 15%. Over the same time period, high-SPED districts reduced special 
education enrollment from 18.7% to 10.1%, a decrease of 8.6 percentage points or 45.9%. In other 
words, districts with the highest special education enrollment rates prior to implementation of 
PBMAS – those that likely faced the most pressure to reduce the percent of students in special 
education – saw the greatest reduction after the implementation of PBMAS. That said, Figure 2 
makes clear that while high-SPED districts experienced the greatest declines in special education 
enrollment, both in relative and absolute terms, even low-SPED distrcts (those in the bottom 
quintile of special education enrollment prior to implementation of PBMAS) experienced slight 
declines in special education after PBMAS was implemented.  
As noted earlier, we ran the same model for districts with the highest and lowest student 
poverty rates and total enrollment and for urban, suburban, and rural districts. We found that 
otherwise similar high- and low-poverty districts experienced relatively similar decreases in the 
percent of students in special education. Relative changes in special education enrollment also did 
The Texas Special Education Cap 17 
 
 
not vary by district size. However, while urban, suburban, and rural districts all experienced declines 
in special eduation enrollment rates following implementation of PBMAS, the decline was 
significantly greater for rural districts than it was for otherwise similar urban and suburban districts. 
 
 
Figure 2. Percent of students in special education in Texas for districts in the top, middle, and 
bottom quintile of special education enrollment during the 2003-04 school year (the year 
PBMAS was implemented), 1994-95 to 2014-15 
 
Note. High-SPED districts are those that fell in the top quintile of percent of students in special education during the 
2003-04 school (the last year before implementation of the PBMAS special education accountability indicator). Mid-
SPED and Low-SPED districts refer to those in the middle and bottom quintile (n=243 in each quintile). The vertical 
dashed line indicates implementation of PBMAS.   
 
Finally, Figure 3 shows distributions of special education enrollment across districts. The 
figure highlights discontinuities near the PBMAS Indicator 10 cutpoint of 8.5%, for the 2014-15 
school year. The left side of Panel A shows that a lower number of urban districts in Texas report 
just above the 8.5% special education enrollment accountability cutoff, compared to the number of 
districts reporting just below the accountability cutoff. Panels B and C show that these results are 
similar for suburban and rural districts. The graphs on the right side of Figure 3 report the same 
information for districts all other states. The distributions for all other states are generally smooth, 
suggesting a lack of manipulation, on average, in special education identification for districts outside 
of Texas. 
Although not reported here, we also find similar discontinuities at the 8.5% cutoff for 
districts that were already in the bottom quintile of special education rate prior to PBMAS 
implementation (i.e., “low-SPED districts,” defined above). In contrast, we find discontinuities at 
the 11% cutoff for districts that, prior to the PBMAS implementation, had higher rates of special 
education enrollment. As noted earlier, the special education accountability provision of PBMAS, 
Indicator 10, includes several levels of special education enrollment rates that districts are 
encouraged to achieve. Although our quantitative analyses focus primarily on the lowest rate of 
8.5%, which provides the highest accountability rating under Indicator 10, districts are also 
encouraged to reduce special education rates to below 15% and below 11%.  
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Panel A. Urban Districts 
 
Panel B. Suburban Districts 
 
Panel C. Rural Districts 
 
 
Figure 3. The distribution of the percentage of students in special education for urban, suburban, 
and rural districts in Texas and all other states, 2014-15  
 
Perceptions and Actions of District and School Personnel 
In this section, we examine the perceptions and actions of district and school personnel. We 
organized these findings by district administrator and educator perspective because of the top-down 
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failures by TEA to ensure district and school personnel were educated on special education 
identification policies and felt safe to implement these policies as intended. Generally, both district 
and school personnel lacked clear knowledge of IDEA policies related to identification and RTI. 
Some individuals took action to intimidate and bully subordinates to meet the 8.5% benchmark. 
District administrator perspectives. Primarily, district administrators were either naïve or 
uneducated on the appropriate and legal implementation of the special education identification or 
felt pressured to comply with TEA despite recognizing that students were inappropriately delayed or 
denied. Superintendent Matt Underwood of Stephenville ISD reported that he held the belief that all 
states had similar monitoring systems with similar indicators or metrics until being contacted by the 
Houston Chronicle. After learning this was not true, he shared that, “Some [students with disabilities 
eligible for special education] have probably fallen through the cracks… I can’t say how many. Even 
one would be bad. One would be terrible” (Rosenthal, 2016a). Another superintendent told the ED 
that he took efforts to reduce special education identification through monitoring the number of 
children in special education. He noted that he “leans on administrators” if the numbers are too high 
because the school board “leans on him” (ED, 2018, p. 4). He also told the ED that the district is 
“taking action to reduce the number of students being referred to special education services and 
ultimately reduce the number of students who require special education services” (p. 4). In this 
district, students in special education declined from 12.5 percent in 2005 to 7.8 percent in 2016.  
 The ED reported that district and school staff did not always understand IDEA’s special 
education identification requirements. For example, some district staff informed the ED that in 
certain cases, “a child suspected of having a disability and needing special education and related 
services can be served under Section 504 for about a year before a recommendation for an IDEA 
evaluation is considered” (ED, 2018, p. 10). Their belief is incorrect and led the ED to conclude that 
district and school personnel were unclear about IDEA guidelines and that accurate information was 
not always available for teachers and parents. 
 Several district-level special education directors openly acknowledged that they felt pressured 
from their district and TEA to reduce the number of students in special education. For example, 
Fort Bend ISD is one of the state’s larger school districts serving over 75,000 students. In 2016-17, 
only 6.7% of students in Fort Bend ISD were identified as students with disabilities. Fort Bend 
ISD's special education director, beginning in June 2015 acknowledged that inappropriate delays for 
special education were occurring because of the PBMAS system. She stated, “It’s something that’s 
always in the back of your mind… You’re being graded” (Rosenthal, 2016a). In 2016-17, 9.5% of  
Seguin ISD students received special education. The special education director in Seguin ISD was 
reported saying, “We live and die by compliance… You can ask any special ed. director; they’ll say 
the same thing: We do what the TEA tells us” (Rosenthal, 2016a). 
Educator perspectives. Teachers reported inaccuracies in their understanding of special 
education policy. Several teachers reported feeling pressured to reduce the numbers of students 
receiving special education. Some teacher interviews revealed situations where students with 
disabilities were not referred or evaluated for special education because the student was already 
receiving services under Section 504 (ED, 2018). The delay or denial was done despite the fact that a 
teacher suspected the student of being eligible for special education. The ED (2018) concluded, 
“even when a teacher suspects that one of these children [child receiving services through Section 
504] has a disability and needs special education … the child may not be referred … in a timely 
manner if the child is receiving services under Section 504” (p. 9). The ED (2018) also found that 
teachers in different districts had different understandings of Section 504 and special education 
identification under IDEA which lead to unnecessary delays and denials for eligible students.  
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 During the ED monitoring visit, targeted questions were asked to teachers about RTI. The 
ED (2018) found that many teachers believed that completing all tiers of the RTI process was 
required before a special education referral. Some teachers expressed a lack of clarity about the RTI 
process and how to monitor student progress within tiers and how they transition from tier to tier 
(ED, 2018). Investigators found that in specific instances, “staff members described suspecting that 
a child may have a disability and not making a referral for an evaluation under the IDEA, or delaying 
the referral, because the child was already receiving services through RTI” (ED, 2018, p. 8). A 35-
year veteran special education teacher who retired from Houston ISD in 2015 said, “RTI is a huge 
roadblock… Every now and again, it would help a kid a little bit, but when you look at the number 
of kids denied, it's not even close to being worth it” (Rosenthal, 2016e). A retired Lamar 
Consolidated ISD teacher stated, “What happens is there are kids that you know right from the 
beginning have challenges and need special ed, and you have to try all of these interventions that you 
know won’t work…It extremely slows up the process” (Rosenthal, 2016a). 
 Numerous teachers described how their district pressured them to lower the percentage of 
students identified into special education. Tyler ISD is a district of 18,000 students, in which 6.8% of 
students receive special education in the 2016-17 school year. A former teacher at Tyler ISD, said, 
“We were basically told in a staff meeting that we needed to lower the number of kids in special ed 
at all costs… It was all a numbers game” (Rosenthal, 2016a). Janice Brassard, who taught for 27 
years and served on the school board for nine years in Beaumont ISD said, “It’s very important to 
the district to stay below the TEA cap… [English learners] are getting language services, so they say, 
‘Well, they’re already serviced’” (Rosenthal, 2016d). Beaumont ISD’s special education identification 
rate for ELLs is 4.2%, while the overall rate in the district is 7.5%. In Houston ISD, 7.0% of 
students are receiving special education. Rebecca Amstutz, who was a math teacher in Houston ISD, 
recalled being told by a colleague, “Don't bother… They won't even take the request. Remember the 
cap,” when she expressed concern for a sixth-grade student who she suspected of having a disability 
(Rosenthal, 2016e). 
 Teachers reported to the Houston Chronicle several ways to delay or deny special education. A 
middle school special education chair in Alief ISD claimed she was told to “go into all these 
meetings with parents of kids with different disabilities and tell them, ‘Oh, Johnny is doing so much 
better. So we want to try him in general education, and of course we’ll give him support” (Rosenthal, 
2016a). A former teacher in San Antonio ISD said, “You look at these kids and they clearly need 
services, but you can’t give it to them because you’re already at 8.5, and you know that some of 
(those families) are going to give up… They’re going to leave the system… We’re abandoning 
them.” A former school psychologist in Cypress-Fairbanks ISD (a district with more than 114,000 
students) claimed that schools would suspend or expel students instead of requesting special 
education evaluations. She said, “It’s a very intentional effort to get the individual to withdraw from 
school instead of access to special education” (Rosenthal, 2016c).  
Teachers also reported feeling pressured by administrators. A veteran language arts teacher 
from Houston ISD said, “We had long, agonizing meetings where we tried to push as many special 
ed students as we could into general education just to meet TEA’s mandate… You realize, this is 
not the best environment for these kids, but there’s nothing you can do about it…” (Rosenthal, 
2016e). He continued, “The principals and the other administrators had a pretty good idea of what 
was going on… If teachers referred too many kids, they’d say, ‘Maybe it’s a classroom-management 
issue.’… Your efficiency as a teacher was questioned” (Rosenthal, 2016e). Other teachers reported 
feeling pressure to push students out of school. A former school psychologist in multiple Houston 
area districts, reported: “Many districts pressure their discipline problems to pursue GED, online 
high school or home school to get them out of the system” (Rosenthal, 2016c). A former school 
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psychologist in Cypress-Fairbanks ISD claimed that schools would suspend or expel students 
instead of requesting special education evaluations because of the pressure from the TEA. She said, 
“It’s a very intentional effort to get the individual to withdraw from school instead of access to 
special education” (Rosenthal, 2016c).  A speech therapist in Laredo ISD said “We basically just 
picked kids and weeded them out… We thought it was unfair, but we did it” (Rosenthal, 2016a). 
Two co-workers reportedly confirmed Gonzalez’s account. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of TEA’s PBMAS Indicator 10. In our 
evaluation of special education data, we compared state trends in special education enrollment rates 
leading up to and immediately following implementation of PBMAS. We showed that Texas 
experienced a significant long-term decline in special education that began immediately following the 
implementation of PBMAS. This trend was not experienced in other states, suggesting that PBMAS 
was likely the underlying cause of this trend. We then explored which types of districts responded 
most strongly to new accountability measure. Those districts with the highest rates of special 
education enrollment prior to the implementation of PBMAS experienced the greatest decline, both 
in relative terms (percent deline) and in absolute terms (percentage point decline). While districts 
size and student poverty rate were not related to changes in special education enrollment rates, we 
found that rural districts had significantly greater special education enrollment prior to PBMAS and 
experienced far greater delcines compared to suburban and urban districts. Finally, we showed that 
districts are more likely have have just under 8.5% special education enrollment, than just over 8.5%, 
suggesting that district leaders may have been taking special steps to ensure no additional students 
received special education services if the district was already near the accountability cut point for 
that year.  
 Publicly available documents from the ED, TEA, districts, and the Houston Chronicle also 
provided valuable insights into how PBMAS Indicator 10 and perceptions of the state's 
accountability system contributed to actions that led to the delay and denial of students in special 
education. Several district administrators, including superintendents, lacked an in-depth 
understanding of IDEA and the individualized nature of special education student identification. 
While TEA initially denied that the PBMAS Indicator 10 was problematic or causing special 
education denials, the ED and Houston Chronicle found evidence that superintendents were “leaning” 
on administrators to limit special education. Interview data was supported by district corrective 
action plans that detailed several districts’ goals to uniformly decrease special education enrollment. 
 District special education directors reported that PBMAS Indicator 10 had a powerful effect 
on district and school practices. The directors noted that they “live and die by [TEA] compliance” 
and the state accountability system is something that is “always in the back of your mind.” District 
and school personnel felt as if there was “no wiggle room” concerning special education 
identification rates. We found these comments troubling because these individuals are their district’s 
most knowledgeable special education experts and are in a privileged position to advocate for 
students with disabilities. IDEA places an affirmative responsibility for school and district personnel 
to proactively refer any child suspected of having a disability. In some situations, special education 
directors disregarded this duty under the pressure of TEA. District personnel disregarding their 
duties is a difficult truth to accept, but corresponds to prior theory and research centered on 
accountability policies, bright line rules, and high-powered incentive systems (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). 
Research on accountability systems also indicates that schools strategically respond to 
accountability in ways that maximize their school's ratings or insulates them from potential threats 
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and sanctions (Amrein-Beardsley, 2009; Jacob, 2017; Nichols & Berliner, 2007). The ED and 
Houston Chronicle found that school personnel (e.g., teachers, principals) were not always 
knowledgeable about identification policies, the appropriate use of RTI, or how other policies like 
Section 504 fit with IDEA. The ED concluded that TEA failed at ensuring districts and schools 
were informed about policies, a key SEA responsibility under IDEA. Teachers and administrators 
also reported taking actions to delay or deny students suspected of having a disability. A Houston 
ISD educator noted that “RTI was a huge roadblock” and other educators shared that they or their 
school's administration purposefully manipulated parents to avoid special education identification.   
Researchers and historians have documented a long history of principal practice aligned to 
managerial duties and compliance with top-down mandates (DeMatthews, 2018; Tyack & Hansot, 
1982). Principals and other administrators were reported using their authority to encourage delays 
and denials. One teacher reported that a principal questioned a teacher’s instruction and classroom 
management practices when referring a child for special education. Others claimed their district 
selected students at random to be de-identified, referred to as “weeding out.” Perhaps, one of the 
more disgusting claims was that a school took intentional efforts for parents to withdraw a student 
from their school. These findings are in line with studies of high-stakes accountability focused on 
testing, where administrators pressure teachers and parents to respond to policy incentives (Nichols 
& Berliner, 2007).  
TEA initially denied allegations and claimed that they had no evidence of cheating. 
Determining TEA's true intentions is beyond the scope of this article, but based on previous 
research on how districts, schools, and educators respond to bright line incentives and a basic 
understanding of IDEA, it seems clear to the authors that the 8.5% metric should have never been 
utilized as an evaluation metric. Issues of over-identification and disproportionality have long 
plagued the IDEA. Perhaps, there were well-intended state, district, and school personnel who 
engaged in practices to limit special education identification. Regardless of intention, sufficient 
evidence exists to suggest that TEA failed at its duties in implementing IDEA and that a statewide 
culture of fear manifested. A history of top-down accountability further attributed to naïve or fearful 
district and school personnel acting in ways that harmed thousands of children. Below we conclude 
with recommendations for how Texas should go about addressing these issues. 
Conclusions 
It is necessary for TEA and disability rights advocates to take full advantage of how 
educational data can be used as a tool for advancing educational equity in special education. The 
following steps can be taken by TEA to identify districts that have systemically denied or delayed 
special education to eligible students. First, TEA can identify district characteristics associated with 
the greatest decline in special education rates. Our analyses shows that rural districts and those that 
had the highest pre-PBMAS special education enrollment experienced the greatest decline. Second, 
TEA can examine “outlier” districts, which have lower average special education enrollment 
relatively to otherwise similar districts. In our prior work, we have demonstrated how such districts 
could be identified (Knight & DeMatthews, 2018). Once these districts are identified, TEA can take 
appropriate actions to support districts, schools, families, and students in making good on past 
wrongs and preventing future injustices.  
 A primary implication of our study is the need for more attention and research on special 
education accountability policies. The fact that a significant statewide decline in special education 
enrollment over 12 years occurred without being identified by educational researchers or research 
institutions is evidence to the need for more attention. We believe our study’s findings provide the 
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foundation for several future avenues of research. This study was limited by its data collection 
process, which did not include interviews with state, district, school personnel, parents, or special 
education advocates. Moreover, this study was limited to just one aspect of special education 
accountability policy in one state. Our study primarily focused on a statewide analysis of data, rather 
than focusing on several districts. Future research might consider an in-depth qualitative approach 
that includes interviews with various stakeholders, a multi-case study approach that investigates 
district and school practices, and statewide personnel surveys to assess stakeholder knowledge of 
IDEA and problems with implementation.  
  Finally, we believe our study has significant implications for special education policy and 
accountability at the national and state levels. It is clear the ED struggled to identify states that are 
out of compliance. The ED's failure is evident by the fact that few states report having districts with 
racial disproportionality despite the national presence of this problem as well as the fact that the ED 
did not intervene earlier in Texas. Special education policies at the state-level cannot be compliance-
driven, but policymakers must also be careful that results-driven accountability does not lead to 
manipulation. In part, improving the quality of special education policy implementation can be 
driven by ensuring states and districts have adequate funding, a continued problem across the state 
of Texas and nationally (IDRA, 2009; Knight, 2012, 2017). While money does not solve all 
problems, added resources and additional training at the state, district, and school-level surely would 
have mitigated some of the unethical practices that transpired between 2004 and the present. 
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Appendix 
 
List of Primary Sources 
 
Date Author Title Description 
2/26/2008 Texas Education 
Agency 
Laredo ISD Important 
Monitoring Information 
TEA letter to Laredo ISD superintendent 
detailing problems with special education 
implementation, including the district’s 
issues with overrepresentation. 
2010 Gatesville ISD 2010-2011 Continuous 
Improvement Plan: 
Special Education 
Monitoring System 
District document that requires a four-
tiered process prior to a student being 
evaluated for special education. 
2010 Karnack ISD 2010-2011 Continuous 
Improvement Plan: 
Special Education 
Monitoring System 
District document that requires a school 
improvement team to meet a minimum of 
three times before a referral to special 
education is made. 
1/22/201 Morgan ISD Special Education 
Monitoring System 2009-
2010: Continuous 
Improvement Plan 
District document that sets goal to decline 
number of students found eligible for 
special education. 
1/28/2011 Texas Education 
Agency 
Marlin ISD letter to 
board of trustees and 
superintendent 
TEA letter to Marlin ISD that documents 
history of systemic special education failure 
and the assignment of a conservator over 
the district’s improvement process. 
1/5/2012 Houston ISD Comprehensive Program 
Improvement Plan 2011-
2012 
Improvement plan document released by 
Houston ISD and their Office of Special 
Education Services that includes a 
benchmark goal of 8% for special education 
identification. 
9/10/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: How Texas 
Keeps Tens of 
Thousands of Children 
Out of Special 
Education 
Part 1 of the Houston Chronicle’s report on 
the Texas special education cap 
10/3/2016 Acting Assistant 
Secretary Sue 
Swenson, 
Department of 
Education 
Memo not titled “Inquiry 
into Houston Chronicle 
Allegations” 
Department of Education requires written 
response to allegations within 30 days. 
10/22/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Schools Push 
Students Out of Special 
Education to Meet State 
Limit 
Part 2 of the Houston Chronicle’s report 
11/2/16 Deputy 
Commissioner of 
Academics Penny 
Schwinn, Texas 
Education Agency 
Response to 10/3/16 
Department of 
Education Letter 
Written response to allegations with 
supplemental documents: 
 Response to Allegations 
 2014 Summary of Public Comment on 
PBMAS 
 2016 Summary of Public Comment on 
PBMAS 
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 Child Count Rates from 2000-01 
through 2015-16 
 Longitudinal Special Education 
Representation Rates in Texas 
 Not the Whole Picture: Letter from 
HISD Assistant Superintendent 
Sowmya Kumar 
11/9/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Mentally Ill Lose 
Out as Special Education 
Declines 
Part 3 of the Houston Chronicle’s report 
11/17/2016 Deputy 
Commissioner of 
Academics Penny 
Schwinn, Texas 
Education Agency 
Reminder about 
Important District 
Responsibilities under 
the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education 
Act 
Letter to all Texas administrators about 
their Child Find obligations and related 
policies. 
12/10/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Texas Schools 
Shut Non-English 
Speakers Out of Special 
Ed 
 
12/24/2016 Susan Carroll and 
Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Unable to Get 
Special Education in 
Texas, One Family 
Moved 
 
12/27/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Houston 
Schools Systematically 
Block Disabled Kids 
from Special Ed 
 
12/29/2016 Brian Rosenthal, 
Houston Chronicle 
Denied: Special Ed Cap 
Drives Families Out of 
Public Schools 
 
6/28/2017 Acting Director of 
Office of Special 
Education 
Programs Ruth E. 
Ryder, Department 
of Education 
Chief State School 
Officer [2017 Needs 
Assistance 
Determination] 
Annual determination letter that provides 
DOE’s reasons for determining Texas 
“Needs Assistance” in implementing Part B 
of IDEA. 
1/2018 Department of 
Education, Office 
of Special 
Education and 
Rehabilitative 
Services 
39th Annual Report to 
Congress on the 
Implementation of the 
Individuals with 
Disabilities Education 
Act, 2017 
Annual national report describing progress 
on the implementation of IDEA with a 
focus on national and state-level 
implementation. 
1/11/2018 Department of 
Education 
2017 Full Monitoring 
Visit Letter 
Findings Letter from Department of 
Education Investigation 
No Date Texas Education 
Agency 
TEA Plan and Response 
to Monitoring Letter 
(Initial Draft Proposal) 
Outline of initial thoughts to address 
corrective action required by DOE. 
No Date Department of 
Education 
Texas 2017 Part B 
Results-Driven 
Accountability Matrix 
Overview of IDEA Part B implementation 
in Texas and with regard to OSEP 
indicators. 
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